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多随从Stackelberg模型在电信增值业务供应链中的应用研究 预览 被引量:8

Research on the Application of Multi-followers Stackelberg Model to the Telecom Value-added Service Supply Chain
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摘要 为了更真实地模拟现实中的电信运营商同时运营销售多个服务提供商的产品的情形,在研究电信增值业务供应链的基础上,根据基本的stackelberg模型及思想建立了单个电信运营商多个服务提供商的单主多从stackelberg模型,并进行了实证分析。结果表明,stackelberg模型可以较好地协调电信增值业务供应链,且验证了供应链的双边际化效应.先发优势及资本市场唯利是图的本质,并得出了一些有意义的结论和建议。 In order to simulate the actual situation of telecom operators operating productions of multi service providers at the same time, based on the research of the telecom value-added service supply chain, the single leader multi-followers Staekelberg model was constructed and empirically analyzed which had single telecom operator and multi service providers. The demonstration results show that the Staekelberg model can coordinate the teleeom value-added service supply chain partly, and demonstrate the double marginalization effects, first-mover advantage and the nature of profit driven in the capital markets, at last some significant suggestions are given.
作者 白秀广 杨洪滨 舒华英 Bai Xiuguang , Yang Hongbin, Shu Huaying(1School of Economics and Management, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, Shanxi Province, China 2School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China 3Institute of Industrial Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100836, China)
出处 《中国通信》 SCIE CSCD 2010年第2期 147-152,共6页 China Communications
关键词 电信供应链 多随从Stackelberg模型 供应链协调 telecom supply chain multi-followers Staekelberg model supply chain coordination
作者简介 白秀广,现西北农林科技大学经济管理学院讲师,2009年7月获北京邮电大学博士学位,主要研究领域包括电信供应链协调、经营决策研究等,发表论丈10余篇,其中5篇被EI、ISTP检索。 杨洪滨,中国社会科学院工业经济研究所博士后,2009年7月获北京邮电大学博士学位,研究方向为电信资费、管制。 舒华英,北京邮电大学教授,博导,主要研究领域:经营决策研究,供应链管理,信息系统。
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